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1 Introduction
The underground (or shadow) economy is broadly defined as economic activities which
are concealed from public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social security
contributions, and to avoid compliance with certain legal standards (e.g. labor market
regulations, trade licenses). Unreported activities are a universal feature of economic life,
and assume considerable proportions even in the industrialized world, where they are
estimated to range between 8 and as much as 28 percent of oﬃcial GDP.1
Most of the research on the causes of this particular form of regulation failure has been
motivated by the observation that the size of the underground economy (as a fraction
of oﬃcial economic activity) varies considerably across countries. The burden of taxes
and social security contributions, excessive market regulation, as well as ineﬀective law
enforcement and corruption, have been suggested to explain these cross-country variations
(see Schneider and Enste (2000), Johnson et al. (1998), Friedman et al. (2000), Lemieux
et al. (1994)).
Yet, there is evidence that the late 1990s saw a striking increase in the size of the un-
derground sectors of both industrialized and developing countries (see Schneider (2005)).
This expansion is only partially explained by the determinants mentioned above. In par-
ticular, a tightening of market regulation cannot have induced all these firms to move to
the underground economy: If anything, the 1990s were characterized by reduced trade
barriers, market liberalization programs, and improved communication and transporta-
tion (Gupta (1997)). One may think that firms should have been encouraged to enter the
oﬃcial economy, but it seems that the opposite was the case. I will argue that there is
1 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for estimates of the size of the underground economy in numerous countries and a
critical discussion of the diﬀerent measurement methods.
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a straightforward explanation for this apparent puzzle: Market deregulation policies and
recent technological developments led to a sharp increase in market competition between
firms, both in the oﬃcial and the underground sector, which ultimately drove firms into
the underground economy.
The reasoning is as follows: A firm which operates in the underground economy can buy
its inputs, in particular labor, at a lower price (because it avoids payroll taxes, disregards
safety and health standards, etc.), thereby reducing its variable cost relative to a firm in
the oﬃcial economy. The underground firm can pass on its savings to consumers, which
will reduce market prices, and as a result its competitors’ profits fall. Thus, the oﬃcial
firm is put at a competitive disadvantage, and may have to choose between operating
underground as well, or going out of business. The fiercer is competition, the higher is
the pressure to reduce costs, and the more likely are underground activities to spread in
the industry.
This reasoning has some parallels in Shleifer’s (2004) argument that competition may
promote unethical behavior (e.g. child labor, corruption, etc.). He highlights the trade-oﬀ
between cost savings and the firm owner’s private utility of ethical behavior, and finds
that an increase in competition tilts this trade-oﬀ in favor of unethical behavior. In my
model, firm owners’ moral considerations play no role. Instead, I study the interaction
between firms and tax enforcement institutions: shadow firms face a risk of being detected
and fined by the tax authority, and this threat feeds back more or less strongly into the
firm’s decision to go underground.
To my knowledge, there is only one paper that relates the shadow economy to market
competition, namely Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003). This paper asks whether we should
expect the informal sector in developing countries to expand in response to trade lib-
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eralization programs (i.e. to an increase in foreign competition on domestic markets).
However, in their model all firms behave as price takers, and law enforcement is com-
pletely absent, so there is no room for strategic interaction among firms and institutions
which is crucial in my set-up.
I will present a simple oligopoly model of free entry and free sector choice, where the
size of the underground economy is endogenously determined in equilibrium. I model the
intensity of competition by the degree of market power, with the source of market power
being product diﬀerentiation. Product diﬀerentiation is a primitive of the model (i.e. I
do not consider the possibility of firms choosing their position in the product space, or
agreeing to collude, or any other form of endogenous determination of competition), and
I find that more intense competition (in the sense that products are closer substitutes,
and so market power is lower) translates into a larger underground sector.
Anecdotes support the view that the underground economy may expand in response to
keener competition. For example, the head of the Austrian Federal Guild of the Construc-
tion Industry (Bundesinnungsmeister des Baugewerbes), Mr. Johannes Lahofer, explains
the rise in shadow economic activity in his industry by recent changes in the way public
building contracts are assigned, referring in particular to the introduction of compul-
sory tenders, and the obligation to assign the contract to the lowest-price bid (article in
”Kurier” of October 4, 2004)
These new regulations prevent local authorities from discriminating against certain
firms (and favoring others) when oﬀering a building contract, and forces them to take
all interested construction firms into account. Applying the concept of competition used
in this paper, we can say that the new laws rendered the construction industry more
competitive by imposing full substitutability of all firms from the point of view of the (in-
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stitutional) buyer. The ensuing increase in shadow-economic activity in the construction
industry is therefore consistent with the line of reasoning laid out above, which suggested
precisely that outcome. A forward-looking government should have anticipated this ef-
fect, and should have monitored the industry more closely to keep the shadow activities
in check.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 solves for
the equilibria of the model, and studies their properties. Section 4 discusses modifications
and extensions of the benchmark model of Section 2, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model Setup
There are two types of agents: firms and the tax authority. Their behavior and decision
variables are characterized as follows.
2.1 The firms
There is an industry with a (very large) pool of potential firms. These firms are ex-ante
perfectly identical, and play the following two-stage game:
Stage 1: Each firm decides (simultaneously with all other firms) whether to enter the
oﬃcial economy, or to enter the underground economy, or to stay out.2 One can think of
the outside option as a non-entrepreneurial activity. Let us normalize the payoﬀ of the
outside option to zero.
The choice between the oﬃcial and the underground economy is irreversible, and I
model it as one between two diﬀerent ”production technologies”, which are characterized
2Note that I treat the decision to operate in the underground economy as an ”all-or-nothing” choice, i.e. I do not allow
for a single firm to ”split” its operations between the oﬃcial and the underground sector. This assumption simplifies the
analysis considerably. I will come back to this issue in Section 4.
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as follows:
(i) Production costs: If firm i operates in the oﬃcial economy, its total production cost
as function of its output qi is
Co (qi) = coqi + CE (1)
while the total production cost of a firm j operating in the underground economy is
Cu (qj) = cuqj (2)
Denote by CE ≥ 0 the entry-regulation cost (red tape) of the oﬃcial firm, which has to
be sunk at stage 1 in order to enter the oﬃcial economy. Let CE be smaller than monopoly
profits of an oﬃcial firm, so that the industry is viable. Assume for simplicity that there
is no other fixed cost of entry in either sector.
The term co ∈ (0, 1) denotes (constant) marginal production cost of the oﬃcial firm,
while cu < co represents marginal cost when operating in the underground economy. The
wedge between co and cu can have diﬀerent sources: If the firm operates in the underground
economy, it can avoid payroll taxes for its workers, can defy environmental or other
regulations which increase the cost of production, and avoid the administrative costs
associated with tax compliance itself (like keeping records, registering workers with the
social security authority etc.).
(ii) Auditing: Every firm will be audited by the tax authority with a probability α
(where α is common knowledge among all firms). If audited, an agent operating in the
underground economy will be detected with certainty and has to pay a fine F ; for an agent
who operates in the oﬃcial economy, the audit will remain without consequences, i.e. I
assume that the tax authority never makes mistakes (see next section for a discussion of
the tax authority and the properties of α and F).
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Stage 2: Given that at stage 1, a total number n of firms entered the industry, out
of which a share of 1 − μ decided to operate in the oﬃcial economy (while μ operate in
the underground economy), at stage 2 the firms will simultaneously choose prices. Then,
markets clear, and profits are realized; the tax authority audits a fraction α of all firms,
and the underground firms that are caught will be convicted to pay the fine F > 0.
Competition among the firms is imperfect in the sense that goods are horizontally
diﬀerentiated, and each firm produces one variety.
Consumers’ valuation for a variety does not depend on how this variety was produced,
i.e. whether it was produced in the oﬃcial or in the underground economy: Consumers
may not be able to verify how the good was produced, or if they know, they do not perceive
any (vertical) quality diﬀerence between goods in the oﬃcial and the underground sector.3
Specifically, consumer demand for variety i, qi, is characterized by
qi (pi, p−i) = max
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
n
⎛
⎝1− pi (1 + γ) +
γ
n
nX
j=1
pj
⎞
⎠ , 0
⎫
⎬
⎭ (3)
where pi is the price chosen by firm i, p−i is the vector of competitors’ prices (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn),
and n is the total number of firms operating in the market.
The parameter γ ≥ 0, which will be crucial for the analysis, measures the (symmet-
ric) degree of substitutability (and hence the intensity of competition) between any two
varieties i and j; if γ = 0, the two varieties are completely independent (hence each firm
behaves as a monopolist facing demand qi (pi) = 1n (1− pi)), if γ is large, the two varieties
are perceived as close substitutes (and hence competition between the two firms will be
very fierce).
This demand function is linearly decreasing in own price, linearly increasing in the
3Note that this assumption also implies that consumers do not face any risk of consuming goods produced in the
underground economy, i.e. I exclude the possibility of joint legal responsibility of consumer and producer once a firm in the
underground economy is caught.
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average price level (i.e. competitors’ prices), and normalized by n, the total number of
varieties in the industry. This function has the advantage of being algebraically conve-
nient, and allows us to capture ”competition” (in the sense of sensitivity of own demand
to rivals’ prices) in a single, exogenous, parameter.
Among the special properties of these demand functions (3), note that the aggregate
demand Q =
nP
i=1
qi = 1 − 1n
nP
i=1
pi does not depend on the degree of substitution among the
products, γ, and that in the case of price symmetry, i.e. pi = p for all i = 1, . . . , n, aggregate
demand does not change with the number of products n existing in the industry.4
2.2 The tax authority
I make the following assumptions:
The tax authority can only intervene at the end of stage 2 of the game (i.e. after firms
produced and sold their output), but not at stage 1.5 At stage 2 of the game, the tax
authority cannot directly observe the prices charged (and the quantities sold) by the firms
on the final good market.6
The tax authority can enforce full payment of the fine, i.e. no partial or total default
is possible. This implies that: (i) firms must have suﬃcient assets to cover the fine7, and
(ii) the tax authority can seize all assets of the underground firms it detects8 .
Both the audit probability α and the fine F are exogenous from the point of view of a
4For a discussion of the derivation and properties of this demand function, see Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Motta
(2003).
5Recall that firms entering the oﬃcial sector pay entry regulation cost CE . Thus, their number and identity becomes
immediately observable to the tax authority. Underground firms, however, cannot be distinguished from non-entering firms
until they become active, i.e. produce (and sell) a strictly positive quantity at stage 2.
6As we will see later, the prices charged by underground firms will diﬀer systematically from those of oﬃcial firms; thus,
if the tax authority could observe these prices, it could easily identify the underground firms, and the detection probability
would have to be 1.
7This will be the case if firms have revenues from activities outside of the industry considered in this model, or if the
fine is (partially) non-pecuniary (e.g. prison sentences, reputational penalties).
8This assumption may not always be satisfied in practice, where underground firms may just shut down their premises
and ”disappear” when they are caught.
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single firm. This assumption implies that:
(i) The audit probability α does not vary with a firm’s output; in particular, an under-
ground firm is not more likely to attract the tax authority’s attention because it produces
more.
(ii) F is independent of the incriminated firm’s output and profits, i.e. the fine is the
same for all firms, no matter what their scale of operation is.9
However, the expected fine, αF , is allowed to vary with the aggregate share of un-
derground firms in the industry, μ. In particular, assume that αF (μ) is some continuous
function of μ. I do not make any assumptions about the exact shape of αF (μ) (it may
be constant, increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in μ) and about the determinants
of the tax authority’s behavior (such as resource or informational constraints, revenue
targets, etc.) that could give rise to such a function.10
3 Equilibria and Their Properties
I will now identify the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibria of the game described
above.
3.1 Equilibrium in the Product Market (stage 2)
Moving backwards, let us first solve for the equilibrium of the price-choice stage. Given
that at stage 1, a total number n of firms entered the market, out of which n (1− μ) firms
decided to operate in the oﬃcial economy (while nμ operate in the underground economy),
a firm i which decided to operate in the oﬃcial economy will maximize its gross profits
9 In practice, tax authorities set fines based on rule-of-thumb estimates of turnover (since actual turnover is not verifiable)
which comes very close to an exogenous fine.
10We will see below that the properties of αF (μ) are decisive for the type of equilibria that can arise in this game.
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as follows:
max
pi
{(pi − co) qi (pi, p−i)} (4)
while a firm j that opted for the underground economy has to solve
max
pj
{(pj − cu) qj (pj , p−j)} (5)
where qi (pi, p−i) and qj (pj , p−j) are defined as in equation (3)11 .
The first-order conditions read
(pi − co)
∂qi (pi, p−i)
∂pi
+ qi (pi, p−i) = 0
(pj − cu)
∂qj (pj , p−j)
∂pj
+ qj (pj , p−j) = 0
where ∂qi(pi,p−i)∂pi = −
1
n
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
.
Let us impose symmetry among the n (1− μ) firms which operate in the oﬃcial economy
(i.e. all firms in this sector charge the same price, po) and among the nμ firms that operate
in the underground economy (which will all charge pu). Thus,
nP
l=1
pl = n (1− μ) po + nμpu.
After inserting this term into the demand function (3), I solve the first-order condi-
tions for p∗o and p∗u (the equilibrium prices charged by the typical firm in the oﬃcial and
underground economy, respectively) to obtain:
p∗o (n, μ) =
¡
2 + 2γ − γn
¢ ¡
1 + co
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢¢
+ (cu − co) γ
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
μ¡
2 + 2γ − γn
¢ ¡
2 + γ − γn
¢ (6)
and
p∗u (n, μ) =
¡
2 + 2γ − γn
¢ ¡
1 + cu
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢¢
+ (co − cu) γ
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
(1− μ)¡
2 + 2γ − γn
¢ ¡
2 + γ − γn
¢ (7)
The first-order conditions also imply that
qi (pi, p−i) = − (pi − co)
∂qi (pi, p−i)
∂pi
and qj (pj , p−j) = − (pj − cu)
∂qj (pj, p−j)
∂pj
11Note that at this stage, i.e. conditional on having opted for the underground sector, the threat of detection has no
influence on the firm’s behavior anymore. This is due to the assumption that αF is independent of qj (pj , p−j), implying
that second-stage (price) choices will be unaﬀected by the expected fine.
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so that the equilibrium quantities sold by each firm are
q∗o (n, μ) = max
½
1
n
(p∗o − co)
³
1 + γ − γ
n
´
, 0
¾
(8)
and
q∗u (n, μ) = max
½
1
n
(p∗u − cu)
³
1 + γ − γ
n
´
, 0
¾
(9)
Finally, gross profits in the price-choice equilibrium are
Πo (n, μ) =
½
1
n (p
∗
o − co)
2 ¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
if q∗o > 0
0 if q∗o = 0
(10)
and
Πu (n, μ) =
½
1
n (p
∗
u − cu)
2 ¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
if q∗u > 0
0 if q∗u = 0
(11)
The following Lemma highlights some of the properties of the product market equilib-
rium:
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, firms operating in the underground economy:
(i) charge a lower price than firms in the oﬃcial economy, i.e. p∗u < p∗o
(ii) have higher mark-ups than firms in the oﬃcial economy, i.e. p∗u − cu > p∗o − co
(iii) make larger gross profits than oﬃcial firms, i.e. Πu > Πo
Proof: see Appendix A
Note that the price and profit relations described in Lemma 1 are entirely driven by
the fact that underground firms produce at a lower marginal cost than oﬃcial firms. The
resulting cost advantage is partly passed on to consumers (through lower prices), partly
retained by the underground firms (through higher markups).
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3.2 Equilibrium at the Entry-Stage of the Game (stage 1)
Recall that equilibrium prices, p∗o (n, μ) and p∗u (n, μ), as well as gross profits, Πo (n, μ) and
Πu (n, μ), are all functions of n and μ, which will be determined simultaneously at stage 1
of the game.
Any equilibrium of the first stage will have to satisfy the following conditions:
(1) (free entry) None of the inactive firms could make strictly positive net profits by
entering the industry;
(2) (breaking even) None of the active firms makes losses (i.e. none of them would
strictly prefer to remain inactive);
(3) (free sector choice) None of the firms active in one sector could make higher net
profits by switching to the other sector.
More formally, we can define a subgame-perfect, pure-strategy equilibrium of the first
stage of the game as a pair (μ∗, n∗) such that12:
(i) ”Coexistence Equilibria”: If firms are active in both the oﬃcial and the underground
sector of the industry, i.e. if μ∗ ∈ (0, 1), then (μ∗, n∗) must solve
Πo (μ, n; ·)− CE = Πu (μ, n; ·)− αF (μ) = 0
(ii) ”Pure Oﬃcial Equilibria”: If all active firms operate in the oﬃcial sector, and no
firm is active in the underground economy, i.e. μ∗ = 0, then (μ∗ = 0, n∗) must solve
Πu (μ, n; ·)− αF (μ) ≤ Πo (μ, n; ·)− CE = 0
(iii) ”Pure Underground Equilibria”: If all active firms operate in the underground
12To simplify the analysis, I will treat both n and nμ as real numbers, even though they are of course constrained to be
positive integers. Thus, the equilibria described and analyzed in the following are in fact just quasi-equilibria.
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sector, and no firm is active in the oﬃcial economy, i.e. μ∗ = 1, then (μ∗ = 1, n∗) must solve
Πo (μ, n; ·)− CE ≤ Πu (μ, n; ·)− αF (μ) = 0
Which of these equilibria will actually arise depends on how the threat of detection
plays out against the higher marginal cost and entry cost of operating in the oﬃcial
economy.
Proposition 1 The game described above
(i) has at least one subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium (this may be a coexis-
tence equilibrium, or a pure oﬃcial or pure underground equilibrium);
(ii) may have multiple equilibria (both pure equilibria, or multiple coexistence equilib-
ria, or any combination of pure and coexistence equilibria).
Proof: see Appendix A
Intuitively, if the expected fine is very high (e.g. so high that even an underground
monopolist’s gross profits do not cover the expected fine), firms will be fully deterred
from entering the underground economy, and we will only see oﬃcial firms operating.
Conversely, if enforcement is close to inexistent, then all firms will operate underground.
If, instead, the expected fine is somewhere in-between, so that not all firms will want to
be in the same sector, we obtain coexistence equilibria.
The number of equilibria that our game has will depend on the shape of the expected
fine αF (μ). To see this, consider all pairs (μˆ, nˆ) that set net profits in the oﬃcial sector
equal to zero.13 By Lemma 1, the underground firm’s gross profits, evaluated at any such
(μˆ, nˆ) must be strictly positive. Now, a pair (μˆ, nˆ) constitutes an entry-stage equilibrium
13 Since Πo (μ, n; ·) − CE is continuously decreasing in both μ and n, higher values of μˆ must be associated with lower
values of nˆ.
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whenever it sets the underground firm’s net profits Πu (μ, n; ·)−αF (μ) equal to zero as well.
Since we have not restricted the shape of αF (μ), there may be multiple values of μˆ at
which Πu (μˆ, nˆ; ·) intersects with αF (μˆ), including μ = 0 and μ = 1. Any such intersection
represents an equilibrium, and hence we can have any arbitrary number of equilibria, and
any combination of pure and coexistence equilibria.
This multiplicity of equilibria recalls a widely held view that countries with a large
underground economy are simply trapped in a bad equilibrium where government cannot
raise enough revenue to provide the kind of public services (in particular state-guided
contract enforcement mechanisms) that could induce firms to move to the oﬃcial sector
and pay the taxes that are needed to fund such services (Posner (1996)). Note, however,
that in my model, the tax revenues raised from the oﬃcial sector do not flow back to the
industry in any way; there is no benefit from paying taxes, other than avoiding the threat
of punishment by the tax authority. Thus, Proposition 1 shows that the ”trap” may even
arise in a setup where there is no link between tax revenues and the quality of public
services.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Recall that our objective was to evaluate the impact of intensity of competition, repre-
sented by parameter γ, on the size of the underground economy. For this purpose, let us
restrict attention to the coexistence equilibria, that is equilibria where firms are active in
both the oﬃcial and the underground sector of the industry.
More formally, let αF (μ) be such that there exists at least one pair (μ∗, n∗), where
μ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and n∗ > 1, solving the equilibrium conditions
Πo (μ, n; γ, ·)− CE = Πu (μ, n; γ, ·)− αF (μ) = 0
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Starting from such an equilibrium, let the competition parameter γ vary slightly. Then,
this change will aﬀect the firms’ gross profits in both sectors (gross profits will decrease if
γ increases), and so μ and n will have to adapt accordingly to allow the industry to settle
at a new equilibrium. Proposition 2 tells us in which direction this change in μ will go.
Proposition 2 If the coexistence equilibrium is stable, then the equilibrium share of firms
operating in the underground economy, μ∗, is increasing in the intensity of competition
γ. In other words, as the industry becomes more competitive, firms will be more likely to
operate in the underground economy.
Proof: see Appendix A
Thus, we find that an increase in competition raises the share of underground firms in
the total number of firms. However, the standard measure for the size of the underground
sector (see Introduction) refers to the output of the underground sector as a share of
oﬃcial GDP. Now, in my model, both the number of underground firms and their output
are endogenous variables that vary with γ, so that our result with respect to μ∗ does not
automatically imply that the relative output of the underground sector is increasing in γ
as well.
To verify that our model replicates this stylized fact as well, denote by s∗ the total
output of all underground firms as share of the total output of oﬃcial firms14 :
s∗ (μ∗, n∗) =
μ∗n∗q∗u (μ∗, n∗)
(1− μ∗)n∗q∗o (μ∗, n∗)
Corollary 3 If the coexistence equilibrium is stable, then the total output of the under-
ground sector relative to the oﬃcial sector, s∗, is increasing in the intensity of competition
γ.
14This variable will help us link our model to the empirical analysis in the following section.
14
Proof: see Appendix A
To summarize: When deciding which sector to enter, firms face a trade-oﬀ: In the
oﬃcial sector, they make lower gross profits than underground firms, and have to pay
the entry-regulation cost; in the underground economy, however, they face the risk of
detection and punishment. If, in equilibrium, firms are active in both the oﬃcial and the
underground economy, then the share of firms in either sector will exactly balance this
trade-oﬀ. Now, as competition becomes more intense, markups in both sectors of the
industry will drop, but markups in the oﬃcial sector will drop faster, thus shifting the
balance in favor of the underground economy.
4 Discussion and Extensions
The result derived above relies on two key features of the model:
(i) Operating in the underground economy allows firms to produce at lower marginal
cost than firms in the oﬃcial sector;
(ii) Firms’ product-market (i.e. price) choices can be separated from the entry and
sector choices (sequential decision making) and from all considerations regarding the risk
of detection (the expected fine is independent of an underground firm’s price or profits).
The results obtained in the previous section are robust to several modifications of the
setup:
- allowing for product market competition in quantities instead of prices
- introducing (flat) taxation of oﬃcial firms’ profits; this creates additional incentives
for firms to go underground
- introducing additional fixed cost (physical setup costs) in both sectors on top of the
entry-regulation cost that firms have to pay to enter the oﬃcial economy
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- allowing the detection probability α to depend on these physical setup costs (to in-
corporate the idea that the larger the facilities required for production, the more ”visible”
a firm will be, and the more diﬃcult it will find it to hide its operations from the tax
authority)
- parameterizing market size (where market size is captured by the intercept of the
demand function, and was set to 1 in the analysis above)
- allowing for diﬀerent functional forms of the demand function (note that both the
existence of equilibria and the comparative statics rely on the continuity of gross profits in
all parameters, and the signs of the corresponding partial derivatives, not on the specific
functional form assumed for demand)
Some of the assumptions in the model may seem strong and deserve a more thorough
discussion:
(i) Recall that in this model, the term competition refers to a firms’ ability to price
above marginal cost. This is not the only sense in which this term can be used; ”compe-
tition” may refer to both market structure and market outcome. As for market structure,
we may think of competition as being restricted by the presence of entry barriers (in
particular administrative barriers like trade licenses), which reduce the number of firms
that can enter the (oﬃcial) industry, and which may entice entrepreneurs into ”bypass-
ing” them by oﬀering their goods or services without the required permits. Thus, if we
equate low competition with high entry barriers, we should expect low competition to be
associated with a high incidence of shadow-economic activity.
However, it is important to distinguish between the entry aspect and firms’ behavior in
the market after entry. Once entry decisions have been made, firms may compete fiercely
in the sense that they charge prices close to marginal cost, or they may enjoy market
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power, that is they may be able to raise prices well above marginal cost without losing
all their buyers to their competitors
(ii) The assumption that underground firms operate at a lower marginal cost than
their competitors in the oﬃcial sector is of course more likely to be met in an industry
where the eﬃcient minimum scale is rather small. Otherwise, oﬃcial firms have a clear
advantage over underground firms, because they have easier access to external financing
that allows them to make the necessary investments. In such an industry, underground
firms are stuck at an ineﬃciently low scale, producing at a higher (rather than lower)
marginal cost than their competitors in the oﬃcial sector.
(iii) The assumption that the fine F is independent of the incriminated firm’s output
and profits may seem unrealistic, because, in practice, enforcement authorities tend to
tailor the punishment ”to fit the crime”. For instance, tax authorities may set fines
according to an estimate of the amount of taxes evaded.
Yet, the scope for variable fines may be limited for several reasons. First, to make an
estimate of taxes evaded, the firms’s profits would have to be verifiable, which may not
always be the case.15 Second, apart from evading taxes, avoiding compliance with labor
and environmental laws may be an important motivation for operating underground. Yet,
this damage is more diﬃcult to quantify and to translate into monetary terms, and so
fixed-fee punishments are more likely applied to these types of infringements.
(iv) Another feature of the model that may raise concerns is the ”all-or-nothing” nature
of the sector choice. In practice, there are many firms that split their operations between
the two sectors, a decision that cannot arise in the model considered so far.
15Recall the assumption that prices and quantities are not directly observable by the tax authority; it could be the case
that even after investigating an underground firm and finding the evidence necessary for conviction, the firm’s output and
profits remain non-verifiable (though potentially observable).
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However, a simple illustration will show that my model prediction holds good even in
a very diﬀerent setting, where I allow for both types of operations within the same firm:
Consider a perfectly competitive industry, where each firm behaves as a price taker. Each
firm chooses the total output q it wants to sell at the going market price. Each unit of
output can be produced in one of two ways: either ”oﬃcially”, i.e. using declared inputs,
in which case marginal cost is some convex function co (q); or ”underground”, i.e. using
undeclared inputs, which is associated with convex marginal cost cu (q).
Interpret c0o (q) > 0 as an inherent property of the production technology, which may be
due to short-run capacity constraints, while c0u (q) > c0o (q) reflects the combined eﬀect of
the technological constraints and the threat of detection and punishment, which I assume
to be increasing in the underground output. Let cu (q = 0) < co (q = 0), so that, for very low
levels of output, producing ”underground” is unambiguously more profitable for the firm.
Suppose that the two marginal cost curves intersect at some output level, call it q∗ > 0,
so that for all q > q∗, the benefits of underground production (payroll tax evasion etc.) are
outweighed by the increasing risk of detection. Then, the firm’s short-run supply curve is
the lower envelope of these two marginal-cost functions, that is, the firm will produce part
of its output (up to q∗) using undeclared inputs, and any q exceeding q∗ using declared
inputs.
In equilibrium, our firm will produce the q that solves
p = C0 (q) where C0 (q) ≡
½
cu (q) for q ≤ q∗
co (q) for q > q∗
Suppose that initially the equilibrium price was high enough to induce the firm to produce
more than q∗, i.e. to have some positive oﬃcial output. Next, assume that there is a
negative shock to the equilibrium price, i.e. the price falls to p0 < p. This could be the
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result of a drastic cut in tariﬀs which allowed more eﬃcient foreign firms access to the
domestic market, or some other exogenous event that makes the environment for domestic
firms more ”competitive”.
Then, the firm will reduce its output to the level which solves p0 = C 0 (q). Note that
the first units of output that will be ”crowded out” are the oﬃcially produced ones; only
when output falls even below q∗ will the firm start reducing its underground operations
as well. In either case, the ratio of underground to oﬃcial output will increase, and if
all firms are symmetric, then the industry-wide underground economy will have grown in
size.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explain the striking increase in the size of the underground
economy in both industrialized and developing countries during the late 1990s. I propose
a novel rationale for this expansion of the shadow economy: the intensity of market
competition among firms.
I develop a simple oligopoly model of price competition with diﬀerentiated goods to
analyze equilibrium outcomes of the decision to operate underground. In this model, the
individual firm can freely choose whether to enter the oﬃcial or the underground sector,
and the intensity of competition in the industry is captured by a single parameter that
represents the homogeneity of product varieties. A tax authority monitors the industry
and imposes fines on those underground firms that it detects.
When deciding which sector to enter, firms face a trade-oﬀ: In the oﬃcial sector, they
incur higher marginal costs of production, and have to pay the entry-regulation cost; in
the underground economy, however, they face the risk of detection and punishment. I
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first show that in equilibrium, firms operating in the underground economy charge a lower
price than firms in the oﬃcial economy, but earn higher mark-ups than firms in the oﬃcial
economy, which implies that they make larger gross profits than oﬃcial firms.
Next, I show that the entry game has at least one subgame-perfect pure-strategy
equilibrium, and that it may have multiple equilibria (where the size of the underground
economy can be anything from 0 to 100 percent). My main result is that as the industry
becomes more competitive (in the sense that the firms’ product varieties become closer
substitutes), a larger share of firms will operate in the underground economy: Competition
reduces profit margins in the oﬃcial sector faster than in the underground sector, thus
increasing the temptation to go underground. This result also carries over to the standard
measure of the size of the underground economy, i.e. the output of the underground sector
as a share of oﬃcial GDP.
Several issues are raised by this paper that deserve further investigation: One key
element of the model is the tax authority’s behavior, which is taken as given in my model
without looking into its determinants. Another issue to investigate are the welfare eﬀects
of underground activity. On the one hand, underground firms evade taxes and fail to
comply with labor and environmental regulations, thus generating considerable social
costs. On the other hand, their presence exerts downward pressure on the prices charged
by oﬃcial firms, which benefits consumers. I would need to make precise assumptions on
the weights of these eﬀects in the social welfare function to draw firm conclusions.
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restrictions on the shape of αF (μ) (other than continuity in μ); now, while Πu (μ, n (μ)) can
be shown to be monotonically increasing in μ, αF (μ) need not be monotonic in μ, thus
allowing for more than one intersection with Πu (μ, n (μ)). In fact, the number of coexistence
equilibria can be arbitrarily large: Define αF (μ) to be exactly equal to Πu (μ, n (μ)) for some
or all μ on the interval [0, 1] to obtain infinitely many coexistence equilibria.¤
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let (μ∗, n∗) be a coexistence equilibrium, so that Πo (μ∗, n∗; γ)−CE = 0 and Πu (μ∗, n∗; γ)−
αF (μ∗) = 0 both hold. Then, we can take the total diﬀerential of both equations at solution
(μ∗, n∗) to have:
d {Πo (·)− CE} = ∂Πo∂γ dγ +
∂Πo
∂μ
dμ+
∂Πo
∂n
dn
d {Πu (·)− αF (μ∗)} = ∂Πu∂γ dγ +
µ
∂Πu
∂μ
− ∂αF
∂μ
¶
dμ+
∂Πu
∂n
dn
Note that if dμ and dn represent adjustments of μ and n to a new equilibrium, following
a change in γ, we must have
d {Πo (·)− CE} = 0 and
d {Πu (·)− αF (μ∗)} = 0
These two equations allow us to solve for dμ
∗
dγ , i.e. the change in the equilibrium share of
firms in the underground economy relative to the change in the competition parameter γ,
which yields:
∂μ∗ (·)
∂γ
=
∂Πu
∂n
∂Πo
∂γ −
∂Πo
∂n
∂Πu
∂γ³
∂Πu
∂μ −
∂αF
∂μ
´
∂Πo
∂n −
∂Πu
∂n
∂Πo
∂μ
Now, to evaluate the sign of this expression, first note that the following inequalities
apply: Both the oﬃcial and the underground firm’s gross profits are decreasing in μ, n
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and γ; the underground firm’s profits drop faster than the oﬃcial firm’s profits when μ or
n increases, while the opposite is true for an increase in γ:
∂Πo (·)
∂μ
< 0,
∂Πo (·)
∂n
< 0,
∂Πo (·)
∂γ
< 0
∂Πo (·)
∂μ
− ∂Πu (·)
∂μ
= 2
1
n
³
1 + γ − γ
n
´ ∂p∗u
∂μ
[(p∗o − co)− (p∗u − cu)] > 0
because 2 1n
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
> 0, ∂p
∗
u
∂μ =
∂p∗o
∂μ < 0, and (p
∗
o − co)− (p∗u − cu) < 0 by Lemma 1.
∂Πo (·)
∂n
− ∂Πu (·)
∂n
= 2
1
n
³
1 + γ − γ
n
´ ∙
(p∗o − co)
∂p∗o
∂n
− (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗u
∂n
¸
+
+
µ
− 1
n2
¶µ
1 + γ − 2γ
n
¶h
(p∗o − co)
2 − (p∗u − cu)
2
i
> 0
because 2 1n
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢
> 0, (p∗o − co)
∂p∗o
∂n − (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗u
∂n > 0 by Lemma 1 and
∂p∗o−∂p∗u
∂n > 0,¡
− 1n2
¢ ¡
1 + γ − 2γn
¢
< 0, and (p∗o − co)
2 − (p∗u − cu)
2 < 0 by Lemma 1.
∂Πo (·)
∂γ
− ∂Πu (·)
∂γ
= 2
1
n
³
1 + γ − γ
n
´ ∙
(p∗o − co)
∂p∗o
∂γ
− (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗u
∂γ
¸
+
+
1
n
µ
1− 1
n
¶h
(p∗o − co)
2 − (p∗u − cu)
2
i
< 0
because 2 1n
¡
1 + γ − γn
¢ h
(p∗o − co)
∂p∗o
∂γ − (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗u
∂γ
i
< 1n
¡
1− 1n
¢ h
(p∗u − cu)
2 − (p∗o − co)
2
i
since ∂Πo(·)∂γ <
0 and ∂Πu(·)∂γ < 0,
1
n
¡
1− 1n
¢
> 0, and (p∗o − co)
2 − (p∗u − cu)
2 < 0 by Lemma 1.
Given these inequalities, we can conclude that the numerator of ∂μ
∗(·)
∂γ will be strictly
positive. Thus, the sign of ∂μ
∗(·)
∂γ is determined by the sign of its denominator. Now, if the
denominator is positive, this is equivalent to having:
− (∂Πu/∂μ− ∂αF/∂μ)
∂Πu/∂n
< −∂Πo/∂μ
∂Πo/∂n
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The left-hand side of this inequality is equivalent to the [dn/dμ]u < 0 that solves
d {Πu (·)− αF (μ∗)} = 0 when γ is kept constant, i.e., [dn/dμ]u identifies the locus in the
(μ, n) space along which the underground firm’s profits are unchanged. The right-hand
side of the inequality is the corresponding [dn/dμ]o < 0 that solves d {Πo (·)− CE} = 0 when
γ is kept constant.
Note that the equilibrium pair (μ∗, n∗) is the intersection of the two loci [dn/dμ]u and
[dn/dμ]o. Now, if [dn/dμ]u < [dn/dμ]o, then this implies that anywhere on the [dn/dμ]o locus to
the right of μ∗, i.e. where μ > μ∗, the underground firms would make negative profits, thus
inducing them to leave the underground sector until μ is back to its equilibrium value.
(If the underground firms were instead to make positive profits, further entry into the
underground sector would occur, until the industry settles at a new, pure underground,
equilibrium).
Likewise, anywhere on the [dn/dμ]o locus to the left of μ
∗, i.e. where μ < μ∗, the
underground firms would make positive profits, thus inducing more firms to enter the
underground sector until μ is back to its equilibrium value.
In other words, if [dn/dμ]u < [dn/dμ]o, this means that the coexistence equilibrium (μ
∗, n∗)
is stable (the industry will revert to this equilibrium after a small perturbation, rather
than moving to an entirely diﬀerent equilibrium); then, the denominator of ∂μ
∗(·)
∂γ will be
strictly positive as well, and this implies that ∂μ
∗(·)
∂γ > 0, as stated in the Proposition.¤
Proof of Corollary 3:
Inserting for q∗u (μ∗, n∗) and q∗o (μ∗, n∗) from equations (9) and (8), we can simplify s∗ to
read:
s∗ (μ∗, n∗) =
μ∗ (p∗u (μ∗, n∗)− cu)
(1− μ∗) (p∗o (μ∗, n∗)− co)
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Then, the first derivative of s∗ with respect to γ is:
∂s∗ (·)
∂γ
=
∂μ∗(·)
∂γ (p
∗
u (·)− cu) (p∗o (·)− co) + μ∗ (1− μ∗)
³
(p∗o − co)
∂p∗u
∂γ − (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗o
∂γ
´
[(1− μ∗) (p∗o (·)− co)]2
The sign of ∂s
∗(·)
∂γ will be determined by the sign of its numerator. By Proposition 2, we
know that if the coexistence equilibrium (μ∗, n∗) is stable, then ∂μ
∗(·)
∂γ > 0. The markups
of underground and oﬃcial firms are strictly positive as well, and so is their product:
(p∗u (·)− cu) (p∗o (·)− co) > 0. In any coexistence equilibrium, μ∗ (1− μ∗) > 0. Finally, 0 <
(p∗o − co) < (p∗u − cu) by Lemma 1, and 0 >
∂p∗u
∂γ >
∂p∗o
∂γ , which implies that
(p∗o − co)
∂p∗u
∂γ
− (p∗u − cu)
∂p∗o
∂γ
= (p∗u − cu)
¯¯¯¯
∂p∗o
∂γ
¯¯¯¯
− (p∗o − co)
¯¯¯¯
∂p∗u
∂γ
¯¯¯¯
> 0
Thus, both numerator and denominator of ∂s
∗(·)
∂γ are strictly positive, implying that
∂s∗(·)
∂γ >
0, as stated in the Corollary.¤
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